Abstract: This paper outlines a range of scenarios describing what the world's energy system might look like in the middle of the century, and what nuclear energy's role might be. The starting point is the 40 non-greenhouse-gas-mitigation scenarios in the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Four illustrative marker scenarios are selected and include growing but varying contributions from nuclear power to electricity supply, while in some scenarios nuclear energy also supplements hydrogen supply by 2050. For each marker scenario, the paper analyses the generic design features of future nuclear power technologies and fuel cycles consistent with the underlying scenario storylines. Keywords: nuclear power; scenarios; long-term; innovation; performance targets; research; development; demonstration.
Introduction
This paper outlines a range of scenarios describing what the world's energy system might look like in the middle of the century, and what nuclear energy's role might be. The starting point is the 40 non-greenhouse-gas-mitigation scenarios in the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Given their international authorship and comprehensive review by governments and scientific experts, the SRES scenarios are a well-accepted starting point for analysing long-term energy issues.
However, they do not present the underlying energy system structures in enough detail for specific energy technology and infrastructure analyses. To clarify the range of possible nuclear energy technology requirements by mid-century, this paper describes, for four selected SRES scenarios,
• the overall energy system implied by each
• a more specific nuclear 'translation' of each focused on scenario features particularly relevant to nuclear energy.
As recommended in the SRES, the selected scenarios cover all four SRES 'scenario families'. The energy system translations in this paper indicate how energy services might be provided by mid-century and delineate technology and infrastructure implications that we consider reasonably likely. This requires the development of images of how people might live in 2050 and beyond, what their workplace arrangements might be, how people commute, what the overall technology paradigms are, what the economic situations in currently developing countries are, which policy objectives dominate and how post-industrial societies are structured by mid-century.
The subsequent, more specific 'nuclear translations' indicate answers to questions like the following. The list is illustrative, not comprehensive:
• What energy forms and other products and services provided by nuclear reactors would best fit the mid-century energy system?
• What would their market shares be?
• How difficult would it be to site new nuclear facilities?
• Which are nuclear energy's most significant competitors?
• Which non-nuclear technologies can nuclear power complement?
• What is the range of potential demand growth for new capacity?
• How is demand growth distributed geographically around the world?
Different scenarios represent different futures and thus imply different answers, which are then the starting point for identifying generic challenges for future reactor and fuel cycle designs around mid-century. Depending on how nuclear energy generation may dovetail with the energy system, one can derive performance requirements in accordance with the different scenarios in terms of economics, safety, proliferation resistance, waste and environmental impacts. These can then help establish key directions in which to encourage innovation. They are intended as a useful input to managers involved in research, development and demonstration (RD&D) strategies targeted on the anticipated energy system needs, and other relevant needs, of mid-century. For performance requirements the paper provides only the initial qualitative steps in the translation from storylines to quantitative performance requirements. A subsequent paper Rogner et al. (2008) seeks to develop cost targets for new nuclear power designs to be competitive in the mid-century energy markets implied by the selected SRES scenarios as well as cost targets for faster nuclear expansion than in the SRES scenarios.
Objective
Our objective is mid-century design targets for nuclear energy. The first step is to describe what the mid-century energy market might look like -the major competitors for nuclear energy, what products are in demand, how much of each, where growth is greatest, and so forth. The mechanism for systematically describing the future market is scenario building. Because we do not know the future precisely, we need several scenarios to reflect our uncertainty.
The starting point is the 40 scenarios in the SRES of the IPCC (2000) . None of the SRES scenarios includes policies designed to avoid or mitigate climate change. They are intended as reference scenarios, to which analysts can subsequently add their own proposed climate change policies if they wish. Or they can be used simply to study potential impacts caused by unrestricted greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We will argue below, however, that two of the four scenarios analysed in this paper are also effectively consistent with future policy constraints on GHG emissions. The set of four scenarios therefore reflects possible futures both with and without GHG constraints.
To concisely reflect the wide range of scenarios in the published literature, the SRES developed four narrative storylines, each representing different demographic, social, economic, technological and environmental developments. For each storyline, several different quantifications, or scenarios, were then developed by six different international modelling teams. The four storylines are labelled A1, A2, B1 and B2. As shown in Figure 1 , economic objectives dominate in the 'A' storylines at the top of the figure while environmental objectives dominate in the 'B' storylines. The '1' storylines on the left incorporate strong globalisation trends and much greater international integration, while the '2' storylines on the right are better characterised by regionalism rather than globalisation.
Figure 1 Schematic illustration of the four SRES storyline families
Source: IPCC (2000) The storylines can be summarised as follows:
• The A1 storyline and scenario family describe a future world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies, reflecting a high level of RD&D and rapid turnover in capital stock. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income.
• The A2 storyline and scenario family describe a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in high population growth. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented, and per capita economic growth and technological change are more fragmented and slower than in other storylines. The capital stock turns over more slowly, including in the energy sector.
• The B1 storyline and scenario family describe a convergent world with the same low population growth as in the A1 storyline, but with significant changes in lifestyles and economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social, and environmental challenges, including improved equity, but without climate initiatives.
• The B2 storyline and scenario family describe a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social and environmental challenges. It is a world with moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic development and capital stock turnover, and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the storyline is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on local and regional levels.
The 40 scenarios in the full SRES report cover many variations within each storyline. However, the scenarios do not present the underlying energy system structures in enough detail for specific energy technology and infrastructure analyses. Moreover, nuclear power in the scenarios often plays the role of a technology of last resort. Technology learning and market adoption rates are usually assumed to be higher for renewable energy technologies, and also for fossil fuel technologies, than for nuclear power. Clarification of the range of possible nuclear energy technology requirements by mid-century requires a clearer understanding and delineation of
• the overall energy system implied by each scenario
For each of the A2, B1, and B2 storylines this paper analyses a single 'marker' scenario representative of central tendencies within the scenario family. For the A1 storyline, we analyse a variation labelled the A1T scenario. The next section lays the essential foundation by defining the energy system. The following four sections report specific results from the quantifications of the A1T scenario and the A2, B1 and B2 marker scenarios just introduced. It is important that each of these specific quantifications not be viewed as the only possible future of the global energy system in an A1T, A2, B1, or B2 world, or even as a tight constraint for nuclear energy. Each should instead be viewed as an indication of opportunities. A specific example in Section 3 will be a huge expansion in renewable after 2050 in the A1T scenario. In the quantification, these renewable provide electricity and hydrogen to meet a booming demand for cleaner, more convenient and more flexible final energy forms. Nuclear energy could equally well provide huge amounts of electricity and hydrogen. The fact that, in the A1T quantification, it is largely beaten to this market by renewable is mainly because the modelling team assumed faster future cost reductions for renewable systems than for nuclear energy, which is consistent with the underlying storyline. The message for nuclear energy is thus that there's a huge future market for electricity and hydrogen in an A1T world, that the principal long-term competitor will be the renewable, that the competition will be decided largely based on cost, and that it will be a tough one.
Thus the numbers are presented below not as predictions of how the race for the future will turn out, but as guidance to nuclear RD&D strategists about where the opportunities lie, who the competitors are, and what might be the deciding factors. The same is true, of course, for the necessary performance improvement for renewables.
The architecture of the energy system
Life is a continuous process of energy conversion and transformation. The accomplishments of civilisation have been achieved, in large part, through the ever more efficient and more extensive harnessing of various energy forms to extend human capabilities and ingenuity. Energy has fuelled human progress in the past and is an indispensable ingredient for continued economic expansion and human development. Providing adequate, affordable energy services is essential for the eradication of poverty, improved human welfare and higher standards of living worldwide. And without economic development, it will be difficult to address the significant environmental challenges ahead, especially those associated with poverty and combating climate change.
However, energy production, conversion or use always generates undesirable by-products and emissions -at a minimum in the form of dissipated heat. Energy can neither be created nor destroyed, but it can be converted from one form into another. The same amount of energy entering a conversion process, say natural gas in a home furnace, also leaves the device -some 80-90% as desirable space heat or warm water, the rest as waste heat, mostly through the smokestack. Although we commonly talk about energy consumption, in fact, energy is transformed, rather than consumed. What is consumed is the ability of oil, gas, coal, nuclear fuels, biomass or wind to produce useful work. In the case of fossil fuels, the chemical composition of the original fuel changes, resulting in by-products of combustion, or emissions.
From the perspective of society, energy is not an end in itself, and it is instructive to define what energy provides. The purpose of the energy system is to meet societies' demands for a variety of services such as cooking, illumination, a comfortable indoor climate, refrigerated storage, transportation, information and consumer goods. People buy mobility, information, food, shelter, etc. not energy per se. That is why modern energy services are usually 'ignorant' of the original primary energy source from which they are derived.
An energy system comprises an energy supply sector and energy end use. The energy supply sector consists of a sequence of elaborate and complex processes for extracting energy resources, for converting these into more desirable and suitable forms of energy and for delivering energy to places where demand exists. The end-use part of the energy system provides energy services, which in households include illumination, cooked food, comfortable indoor temperatures, refrigeration and transportation. Energy services are also required for virtually every commercial and industrial activity. For instance, heating and cooling are needed for many industrial processes, motive power is needed for agriculture, and electricity is needed for telecommunications and electronics. The energy chain that delivers these services begins with the collection or extraction of what nature provides (e.g., coal, wind, uranium) that, in one or several steps, may be converted into energy carriers, such as electricity or diesel oil, that are suitable for end uses. Energy end-use equipment -stoves, light bulbs, vehicles, machinery -converts final energy into useful energy, which provides the desired benefits, the energy services. Examples of the many different options at each stage of an energy chain are shown in Figure 2 . Energy services are the result of a combination of various technologies (each with its own environmental impacts), infrastructure (capital), labour (know-how), materials and primary energy sources. Each of these inputs carries a price tag, and they are partly substitutable for one another. From the consumer's perspective, the important issues are the economic value or utility derived from the services. Consumers are often unaware of the upstream activities required to produce energy services. Figure 2 The architecture of the energy system This is a generic presentation of the energy system and the source-to-service links are only indicative and not comprehensive.
Source: Rogner and Scott (2000) Figure 2 illustrates schematically the architecture of an energy system as a series of linked stages connecting various energy conversion and transformation processes that ultimately result in the provision of goods and services. A number of examples are given for energy extraction, treatment, conversion, distribution, end use (final energy) and energy services in the energy system. Not only the technologies that link the various stages of the energy system but also the technical means by which each stage is realised have evolved over time, providing a mosaic of past evolution and future options. Modern energy services rely on manufactured or processed fuels and sophisticated conversion equipment. In contrast, traditional energy services predominantly rely on unprocessed fuels close to their primary form and low (or no) technology conversion devices. Low technology energy conversion usually implies low efficiency and high pollution. This points to technology as one of the most critical links between the supply of energy services and environmental compatibility, access and affordability. Technology is more than a power plant, an automobile or refrigerator and includes infrastructures such as the building stock, settlement patterns, road and transportation systems as well as industrial plants and equipment. It also includes social and cultural preferences as well as legal frameworks and regulatory aspects.
Bringing electricity to homes and commerce, natural gas to industries or gasoline to gas stations has been the core business of the energy sector. More recently, energy sector liberalisation, which has turned strategic goods into commodities, has also begun to change the energy sector from selling electricity or litres of gasoline to selling energy services. In terms of Figure 2 , this means that energy sector companies will get more involved in energy service supplies including assuming stewardship of end-use technologies.
A particular energy service can be supplied by different combinations of energy and technology. In this context, technology is often viewed as capital and know-how. To a large extent, energy and technology/capital/know-how can substitute for each other. Replacing less efficient and dirty technologies with more efficient and cleaner ones is the substitution of capital and know-how for energy. Capital investment, however, involves energy embedded in materials, manufacturing and construction as well as labour and know-how.
For all these reasons, any analysis of individual technology aspects in isolation from the technology's integrated function within the full energy system and without a good understanding of the markets it serves is incomplete. The detailed scenario descriptions below attempt to provide the energy system backdrop against which future nuclear energy technologies and fuel cycles should be assessed.
A1T scenario
Although the SRES scenarios focused on GHG emissions, these are based on detailed energy demand and supply balances based on different technology performance expectations and resource availabilities. Scenarios developed by the six SRES modelling teams showed that projected emissions for the A1 storyline depended greatly on the technologies that were assumed to progress most quickly. Figure 3 shows projections using the Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental impacts (MESSAGE) of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) for four different A1 scenarios.
1 The A1B scenario assumes balanced progress across different energy technologies. The A1C scenario assumes that clean coal technologies largely win the race for economic competitiveness. The A1G scenario assumes gas and oil technologies outpace the others, and the A1T scenario assumes that advances in non-fossil technologies -renewable, nuclear and high-efficiency conservation technologies -make them the most cost-competitive. GHG emissions for the four scenarios vary tremendously. In fact, they vary almost as much across these four scenarios within one storyline as they vary across all 40 scenarios in the SRES report.
The A1 scenario that we analyse in this paper is the A1T scenario shown in Figure 3 . We recognise that the A1T scenario in the SRES report describes a plausible outcome in a world that explicitly eschews policies limiting GHG emissions while aggressively pursuing high efficiency and non-fossil technologies. As is evident from the top panel of Figure 3 , however, these policies have a substantial environmental co-benefit. The A1T emission trajectory in Figure 3 is consistent with stabilising the atmospheric carbon concentration at about 560 ppmv (parts per million by volume), a level potentially consistent with the objectives of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Due to this, and because the subsequent addition of a 550 ppmv constraint on top of the SRES A1T scenario makes almost no difference to the quantitative modelling results (Röhrl and Riahi, 2000) , we believe this scenario also describes a plausible outcome in a world that is just like the SRES A1T world with one exception -it does choose to implement explicit policies on GHG emissions (Langlois et al., 2002) . Thus it would be a plausible trajectory for an A1T-like world that includes the Kyoto Protocol and successive (or alternative) more stringent agreements. The most innovation-intensive scenario, A1T, where highly efficient technologies diffuse rapidly throughout the energy system, has by far the lowest primary energy requirements.
General scenario description 2
The 'A' in A1T indicates a world in which economic objectives tend to dominate other objectives, such as environmentalism and international equity. This is also a world better characterised by 'globalisation' than 'regionalism', as indicated by the '1' in A1T, with the result that high economic growth and productivity growth translate into rapid growth in developing countries and greater equity worldwide. As noted above, the 'T' indicates a strong emphasis on advanced, efficient, non-fossil energy technologies throughout the energy system and rapid technological change toward post-fossil fuel alternatives. The demographic transition is rapid due to accelerated rates of economic development and the associated favourable social environment (education, reduction of income disparities, etc.). Global population grows to some nine billion by 2050 before declining to about seven billion by 2100.
The global economy expands at an average annual growth rate of about 3%, reaching around US$ 675 trillion 3 in 2100, compared to US$ 31 trillion in 2000. Global average income per capita reaches about US$ 26,000 by 2050.
Energy and mineral resources are abundant because of rapid technical progress, which both increases the economically recoverable reserves and reduces the resources needed to produce a given level of output. Final energy intensity (energy use per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) decreases at an average annual rate of 1.3% -some 30% faster than the historically observed long-term trend. The concept of environmental quality changes in the A1 storyline from the current emphasis on 'conservation' of nature to active 'management' of natural and environmental services, which increases ecological resilience.
Energy system and infrastructure
While Figure 4 4 and Table 1 faithfully present data from the quantification of scenario A1T in the SRES report by the MESSAGE model, the narrative from this point forward builds on the scenario descriptions in the SRES report, but goes beyond them to reflect our own interpretations of possible key features eventually relevant for nuclear technologies.
The key continuing change in the energy system in the A1T scenario is decentralisation. In the most prosperous nations this means that traditional electric utilities will have essentially disappeared by mid-century. Many vehicles will be powered by fuel cells. When these vehicles are parked, they can continue generating electricity and be connected to an office building, an individual house, a shopping mall, etc. Computer systems could refuel the parked vehicle with hydrogen as needed as all buildings and residences are connected to comprehensive hydrogen grids. The bulk of electricity generation will be based on vehicular fuel cells. The load factor of a car is 2-5% which means that the car is parked 95-98% of its lifetime -usually close to where the drivers stay anyway at home, at work or at leisure venues such as restaurants, theatres or sporting events. These car-driver locations are precisely where the demand loads arise. Current global automotive generating capacity is approximately one order of magnitude larger than total utility and non-utility electricity generating capacity. So spare and reserve capacity would not be a constraint. Table 1 Electricity and hydrogen production and growth by region in the A1T scenario Table 1 Electricity and hydrogen production and growth by region in the A1T scenario (continued) Hydrogen technologies are developed rapidly because
• hydrogen can provide the storage medium required to overcome the disadvantages of intermittent renewables like solar and wind power (which play a large role in the A1T scenario)
• hydrogen is needed to first complement and then replace fossil fuel in the transport sector
• hydrogen is a convenient, flexible and clean fuel that, with the development of technology (e.g., fuel cells, mini-and micro-turbines, catalytic and thermoelectric converters), will eventually be able to substitute for grid-connected electricity and chemical fuels in essentially all end-uses.
Thus, as shown in Figure 4 , electricity and hydrogen (in the category 'others') are the only forms of final energy that continue to rise in the A1T scenario right through 2100. The facilities generating hydrogen, whether from fossil, nuclear or renewable fuels will have to meet increasingly strict safety and environmental standards. Historically, both safety and environmental standards have risen as societies become more affluent. That trend continues in the A1T scenario and is reinforced by the preference for advanced, efficient, non-fossil clean energy technologies. Higher standards will generally translate into greater difficulties for siting energy facilities of all sorts.
While there is a preference for recycling, the general approach to waste disposal, from all sources, is also to set strict but clear standards, and then create 'waste markets' that encourage investments to maximise the efficient reuse of what is recyclable and minimise the cost of disposing of the rest (or storing it in case a new future use is developed). Since countries will have different comparative advantages when it comes to recycling or to ultimate disposal, integrated international waste markets will imply a lot more trading in waste than there is today.
Both closed and open nuclear fuel cycles would be consistent with the A1T scenario, and both could co-exist in this scenario. What will make the difference is economics. To the extent that spent fuel is not recycled, there may well be a preference for retrievable long-term storage over permanent disposal given the ethic of recycling for economic efficiency and the expectation that technological progress will continually create new uses for current by-products.
A1T technologies
Liquid fuels from coal, unconventional oil and gas sources and renewables become available by around 2030 at costs approaching today's oil prices, with costs continuing to fall by about 1% per year through learning-curve effects. Decentralised electricity from renewables, particularly photovoltaics, begins massive market penetration, expanding from niche markets particularly in developing regions without established electricity grids. With expansion and experience, costs drop very rapidly -reaching today's best practice levels within a few decades and then falling to perhaps one tenth of that by 2050. For all these technologies, much of the decrease is the result of learningcurve effects driven by substantial growth in energy use coupled with decentralisation and a preference for non-fossil technologies. The energy efficiencies of household devices, buildings, industrial plant and equipment and vehicles grow at unprecedented rates. Additional efficiency improvements are assumed to take place with the diffusion of new end-use devices for decentralised production of electricity (fuel cells, micro turbines).
In the most prosperous countries, there is full commercialisation of the Proton exchange membrane (PEM) fuel cell as the principal alternative to the internal combustion engine. Commercialisation is the result of a market pull driven by policy objectives to combat smog in large metropolitan areas. Most of the automobiles in the streets are powered by fuel cells.
Although the principal fuel of PEMs is pure hydrogen, a considerable share of fuel cell vehicles is equipped with onboard reformer/partial oxidisers and generates hydrogen from a hydrocarbon fuel (e.g., methanol). This allows the utilisation of the still existing oil product distribution and refuelling infrastructures. Fleet type vehicles returning routinely to their base are fuelled with neat hydrogen (compressed, liquid or absorbed) generated from small-scale stationary steam methane reformers hooked to the local natural gas grid. This eventually buys down the costs of hydrogen refuelling stations and increases the coverage of such stations. Hydrogen and other alternative fuels might also penetrate the market through an additional route, 'fuel in a box' for initially small-scale fuel cell applications sold, for example, in six-packs of two-litre bottles over the counter or in dispensing machines (Shell, 2001) . Such a supplementary route could exploit existing distribution networks with almost no incremental capital costs and might expand particularly quickly in currently developing countries where it matches current distribution channels for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) bottles, kerosene and traditional lamps and cookers, and where consumers might initially want only small amounts of fuel at a time.
Whatever the initial mix of distribution alternatives, as technology learning reduces costs and improves reliability and lifetimes of PEMs, consumers start to use stationary fuel cell systems with integrated gas reformers to provide back-up and/or peak supplies. Pipeline gas is increasingly 'doped' with hydrogen (hythane) to meet demand, to avoid capacity squeeses and to mitigate pollution. Hythane implies more centralised dedicated hydrogen production. In addition to large-scale steam reforming of natural gas (with the option of lowest cost carbon sequestration) electrolytic hydrogen enters the market primarily based on cheap off-peak hydro and nuclear power as well as intermittently available renewable technologies.
The supply of oil and gas in the A1T scenario is assumed to be initially adequate to meet growing primary energy demand and results from high rates of technological progress for fossil exploitation and extraction technologies. Throughout the 21st century, large amounts of biomass are utilised through well-developed biomass farm plantations and harvest technologies. Biomass utilisation technologies, such as biomass power generation and bio fuel conversion technologies, become available at low costs through RD&D and learning curve effects. The innovation impact of 'technology push' through RD&D and 'demand pull' caused by the desire for a clean environment is largest for other renewable energy technologies and infrastructures. Low-cost conversion systems based on solar photovoltaics and thermal utilisation, wind farms, geothermal and ocean energy dominate the primary energy mix in the second half of the 21st century. Nuclear energy appears to play the role of a swing supplier similar to that of oil in the second half of the 20th century.
Implications for nuclear energy
In the SRES quantification of the A1T scenario using the MESSAGE model, nuclear energy's share of global primary energy use grows to 115 EJ by 2050, about 12 times current levels (see Figure 4 ). Nuclear energy's contribution then peaks several decades later at about 175 EJ and drops back to 115 EJ (the 2050 level) by 2100. A truer picture of the potential market for nuclear energy in this scenario, however, would combine its nuclear projections through 2050 with some fraction of its projections for 'other renewables' in the second half of the century. Figure 4 shows both nuclear and 'other renewables' growing at about 5.3%/yr through 2050, while total energy use grows at only 2.1%/yr. After 2050, however, everything slows down, and every source except biomass and other renewables peaks and begins to decline before 2100. For the fossil fuels, that is partly due to environmental impacts (n.b. coal) and partly due to resource constraints (n.b. oil and gas). But for nuclear energy, it is due principally to assumptions about how fast nuclear costs will decrease relative to renewable costs. Today, nuclear base load electricity is cheaper than electricity from 'other renewables' (OECD/NEA/IEA, 2005). Thus the message of Figure 4 is that if the nuclear industry can maintain or extend that advantage, the market for electricity and hydrogen in the 21st century is big enough to support average growth rates for nuclear energy over 5%/yr through 2050 and above 3%/yr from 2050 to 2100, more than twice the corresponding growth rates for global energy use as a whole. Table 1 breaks down the projected energy expansion from Figure 4 among the four world regions used in the SRES:
• The OECD90 region includes all countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as of 1990 and corresponds to the Annex II countries in the UNFCCC.
• The REF region comprises those countries undergoing economic reform and groups together the East European countries and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. It includes Annex I countries outside Annex II as defined in the UNFCCC.
• The Asia region includes all developing (non-Annex I) countries in Asia.
• The ALM region, which we re label the 'ROW region' (rest of the world) for the rest of this paper, covers the rest of the world and includes all developing (non-Annex I) countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Shown in Table 1 are the scenario results for electricity and hydrogen production through 2070, plus the projected contributions from both nuclear power and its principal competitor in the A1T scenario, solar. All projections are broken down by region. The right three columns show the average annual generation increments for the periods 2000 -2030 , 2030 -2050 and 2050 -2070 TWh equals the annual output of a 1,000 MWe power plant with a capacity factor of 91%. For reference, 8 TWh equals the annual output of a 1,000 MWe power plant with a capacity factor of 91% or the output of a solar photovoltaic plant of 3,650 MWe with a capacity factor of 25%.
(The resulting nuclear and solar generating capacity increments do not include retirement replacements.) Some features of the prospective market for nuclear power as reflected in Table 1 and the full A1T scenario results are:
• The principal product market is electricity with a significant market also in hydrogen, especially after 2030.
• Through 2030 electricity capacity additions are greatest in Asia, with ROW and OECD tied for second. After 2030 principal growth is shared equally between ROW and Asia.
• Hydrogen capacity growth is initially dominated by the OECD. It shifts to Asia and ROW around 2050.
• Competition for new electricity capacity is initially quite balanced between coal, gas, nuclear and solar. Coal drops out around 2020 and gas around 2040, leaving the competition to nuclear and solar.
• In REF and OECD, however, nuclear is assumed to lose out after 2050-2060 to solar and, in REF, hydro and wind. The market for new Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) shifts strongly to Asia.
These then are the quantitative outlines of the market for nuclear generated electricity and hydrogen suggested by the A1T scenario. The next step is to speculate on the qualitative features of nuclear technologies that would be consistent with both these projections and the overall features of the A1T scenario as summarised above and detailed in the full SRES report. This step builds on the description in the SRES report, but necessarily goes beyond it to reflect our own interpretations of the A1T scenario's features that are most relevant for nuclear technologies. First, given the T (technology-intensive) in the A1T scenario -accelerated RD&D and innovation is likely to bring about a series of reactor designs, fuel cycles and unit sizes consistent with the requirements in different markets and countries. It is certainly not a 'one-size-fits-all' technology scenario and diversity is a virtue not a vice. Second, we expect an increasing and eventually large share of hydrogen production to come from centralised, large-scale nuclear power parks on the order of hundreds of GWe of capacity. One prerequisite for such parks is the highly interdependent globalised economy of the A1T scenario in which comparative advantage and economies of scale are generally pushed to the limits of their profitability. Energy supply security in the A1T scenario does not mean a large domestic contribution to a country's energy supplies. Rather it means access to the most cost-effective supplies in the world through a transparent, vibrant and flexible free global market. If the most cost-effective supply of hydrogen is from a large nuclear park on the other side of the world, then that is the source a country will choose (just as many today choose oil from the most cost-effective supplier, even if it also is half a world away). A third driving force for large nuclear parks is the increasingly stringent safety and environmental standards expected with increasing affluence. Siting for both NPPs and repositories for spent fuel and waste is unlikely to get much easier than it is today. Given the storability and transportability of hydrogen, this creates incentives for at least hydrogen producing nuclear plants to be located at repositories, together with fuel enrichment and fabrication facilities, and generally as much of the fuel cycle as possible. Such collocation is economic as a result of each park being large enough to warrant its own enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing and waste preparation infrastructure. It could also be consistent with cooperative global progress toward international control of proliferation-sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, as currently called for by the Director General of the IAEA (ElBaradei, 2003 (ElBaradei, , 2005 (ElBaradei, , 2006 .
Collocation minimises both the required number of sites for nuclear facilities and transport requirements for nuclear material. The only transport requirement might be for fresh natural uranium, and even that could be eliminated if the complex is located close to seawater and uranium is extracted from the essentially limitless amounts of low-concentration uranium dissolved in seawater. Such large nuclear parks would, in the affluent globalised A1T world, most likely be designed to internationally agreed safety standards. Assuming that, with increasing affluence, increasingly strict safety standards follow the progression foreseen by conventional wisdom today, future safety standards would likely require passive safety systems and no possible radiation impact beyond the park perimeter. Compliance would be overseen by international as well as national regulatory bodies.
Nuclear park sites that include repositories would require long-term monitoring and management, creating an incentive to use them continuously as much as possible for operating reactors, even as one generation of reactor replaces another and fuel cycles evolve. Continuous use, an onsite repository plus long-term monitoring and management requirements mean that decommissioning requirements are of a much lesser degree than they would be for green field decommissioning. For nuclear parks without repositories, the A1T scenario would probably be conducive to international waste disposal options, allowing countries to take advantage of any comparative advantage they may have in waste disposal due either to geology, infrastructure, expertise or public acceptance.
Alternatively, underground nuclear parks possibly sited in shallow domal salt deposits some 2,000 meters below the surface could contain the entire fuel cycle, reactors and collocated final waste repositories (Meyers and Elkins, 2004) . By their very nature, such parks would offer not only increased margins of safety, physical security and proliferation resistance, especially if put under international control, but also attractive life cycle generating costs.
Consistent with its interest in minimising siting and transport requirements, we imagine that the A1T scenario would also be conducive to the development of smaller 'self-sufficient NPPs', i.e., sealed NPPs with low maintenance requirements and long operating periods between refuelling. Such reactor designs would be adopted by smaller developing countries, communities and energy-intensive industries in remote areas. Suppliers would deliver such a plant fuelled and ready to connect to the local electricity grid, hydrogen grid or desalination plant. Many years later, when the NPP needed refuelling, the supplier would replace it with another self-sufficient NPP, again fuelled and ready to connect. Self-sufficient NPPs might be particularly attractive in regions that are relatively inaccessible for hydrogen pipelines, without requiring the build-up of a nuclear infrastructure for fuel handling and extensive maintenance. Decommissioning would be the responsibility of the supplier, who could likely take advantage of one or more large nuclear parks (and repositories) in which he would likely have an interest.
International safeguards are extensive at large nuclear parks and efficiently integrated into the design of the whole fuel cycle. There would be no proliferation-based argument against reprocessing on the site or other approaches to reduce waste volumes. Choices would be based largely on economics. Safeguards on self-sufficient NPPs would concentrate on the supplier. To assure non-proliferation while the NPP is with the buyer, designs would rely more on technological and design barriers to proliferation than on traditional safeguards inspections. Nonetheless, institutional non-proliferation measures in the globalised cooperative A1 world are assumed to be greater than today, with the IAEA enjoying greater resources (e.g., satellites) and authority (e.g., universal adherence to the additional protocol).
The bottom line for new construction in this scenario would be economics. As noted above, no premium is attached to having a high percentage of domestic energy sources, and the scenario assumes no climate change policies that sharply penalise fossil-fired power plants. Specific cost targets associated with the A1T scenario are, as noted at the outset, addressed in a separate paper (Rogner et al., 2008) .
The expansion of nuclear energy production in the A1T scenario by a factor of more than 20 between 2000 and 2070 (Table 1) raises the issue of possible uranium resource constraints. Identified conventional uranium reserves are estimated to be sufficient for 85 years' worth of nuclear power production at the production level of 2004, assuming an exclusively once-through fuel cycle (OECD/NEA-IAEA, 2006; IAEA, 2007) . However, this number goes up to 270 years for total conventional resources, which include resources expected to occur in known deposits and resources thought to exist in geologically favourable yet unexplored areas. And it goes up to 675 years for total conventional and unconventional resources, which include 22 million tonnes of uranium in phosphate deposits. Since nuclear energy production declines in the A1T scenario after 2070, these resources would be almost sufficient through 2100, the analytic horizon of the SRES report, even assuming an exclusively once-through fuel cycle for all reactors. The SRES A1T scenario, however, includes two generic nuclear technologies: a generic low-cost technology to represent evolutionary improvements in current light water reactors and a generic high-cost technology that could represent either fast breeder reactors, fuel cycles exploiting more diffuse uranium resources than included above (e.g., uranium in seawater), or other advanced reactors and fuel cycles. These options would increase the longevity of uranium resources substantially beyond 2100. Fast breeder reactors, which feature in plans of several countries with substantial nuclear power programmes, such as China, France, India, Japan and Russia, could increase resource longevity by a factor of 60-70.
A2 Marker scenario

General description 5
The 'A' in 'A2' indicates a world in which economic growth objectives have a stronger influence relative to environmental objectives. The '2' indicates a world better characterised by 'regionalism' than 'globalisation'.
Key characteristics are self-reliance in terms of resources and less emphasis on economic, social and cultural interactions between regions. Economic growth is uneven and the income gap between industrialised and developing parts of the world does not narrow appreciably. Global average per capita income in A2 is low, reaching about US$ 8,900 per capita by 2050 and US$20,000 in 2100. By 2100 the global GDP reaches about US$ 300 trillion, compared to US$ 31 trillion in 2000.
With the emphasis on family and community life, fertility rates decline relatively slowly, which makes the A2 population grow substantially to 15 billion by 2100. Fertility rates vary considerably among regions. By 2100 less than one-tenth of the world's population would live in OECD countries, and a pronounced shift would occur in the population distribution from Asia to the ROW region (specifically Africa).
Energy system and infrastructure
Important features of the A2 scenario are relatively slow end-use and supply-side energy efficiency improvements, slow developments in renewable energy technologies and low political barriers to the use of nuclear energy. The fuel mix in different regions is determined primarily by resource availability. High-income but resource-poor regions shift toward advanced post-fossil technologies (renewables or nuclear), while low-income resource-rich regions generally rely on proven fossil technologies that improve relatively slowly.
The primary energy structure of the A2 scenario is also reflected in the cumulative fossil fuel resource use, characterised by an increasing reliance on coal resources. Given the regional orientation of the A2 scenario storyline and the resulting quest for energy independence, the possibility exists of tapping even currently 'exotic' fossil resources.
There are only slow improvements in the energy supply efficiency and a relatively slow convergence of end-use energy efficiencies in the industrial, commercial, residential and transportation sectors between regions. Final energy intensities decline at the rate of 0.5-0.7% per year. A combination of slow technological progress, more limited environmental concerns and low land availability because of high population growth means that the energy needs of the A2 world are satisfied primarily by fossil fuels (mostly coal) and nuclear energy. Environmental concerns are perhaps least important in the A2 scenario family, and they are mostly local in nature. For instance, no environmental barriers to nuclear energy development or environmental costs of fossil energy use are assumed.
A2 technologies
Technological change in the A2 world is heterogeneous across countries as industry adjusts to local resource endowments, culture and education levels. Regions with abundant energy and mineral resources evolve more resource-intensive economies, while those poor in resources place a very high priority on minimising import dependence through technological innovation to improve resource efficiency and make use of substitute inputs.
In the A2 scenario, technological development progresses relatively slowly and focuses on fossil fuel production and conversion technologies, especially coal, allowing fossil fuels in general, and oil in particular, to maintain their dominant position in the energy supply. In the longer run by 2050, when conventional oil and gas resources become scarcer, coal takes the leading role. Through 2100, the largest share in the primary energy supply belongs to coal, followed by natural gas as shown in Figure 5 . Renewables play an especially important role in the ROW region. In Asia, nuclear is the second most important source after coal. Initial resource base assumptions for the heterogeneous A2 world reflect the preference for domestic energy resources with innovation focusing on the future use of unconventional fossil energy resources such as methane clathrates, heavy oils, etc., or on the future use of coal for liquid and gaseous fuel supplies. The overall rate of innovation is slower than in the A1 scenario. A rapid shift toward high-technology renewable energy or deep-sea carbon storage is highly improbable in the A2 world due to the focus on domestic technology development and deployment and little international cooperation. Conversely, relatively low-technological measures such as capturing and using methane from natural gas systems, mining and landfills better fit the A2 world's economic and technological profile. Hydrogen plays an important role only in selected countries of the OECD region. It is produced from natural gas for use in transportation. Assumed technology diffusion barriers imply very high levels of energy intensity. The final energy intensity of GDP declines steadily but slowly between 2000 and 2100. The fastest reduction occurs in the REF region and the slowest in OECD countries. The A2 scenario includes slow improvements in energy supply efficiency and a relatively slow convergence of end-use energy efficiencies in all sectors between OECD and other regions.
Centralised large power plants are necessary in most regions to satisfy the large demand for electricity due to high population growth. Consequently, large hydropower is attractive where resources are available, as in some Latin American countries. Improvements in the cost of clean coal technologies are realised allowing countries with coal resources to continue depending on this fuel as the major source of electricity generation.
Synthetic liquid fuels such as methanol are produced in some regions to satisfy growing transportation requirements. Most methanol is produced from natural gas or biomass. The share of biomass in primary energy increases from 10% in 2000 to 14% in 2050, after which it remains essentially unchanged.
Implications for nuclear energy
In the SRES quantification of the A2 scenario using the MESSAGE model, nuclear energy generates 45 EJ of energy in 2050 or about five times the production level in 2000 (see Figure 5 and Table 2 ). Shown in Table 2 are the scenario results for electricity production through 2070. All projections are broken down by region. Like Table 1 , the right three columns show the average annual generation increments for the periods 2000-2030, 2030-2050 and 2050-2070 . Some features of the prospective market for nuclear power as reflected in Table 2 and the full A2 scenario results are:
• The product market is exclusively electricity. There is no hydrogen production from NPPs.
• Capacity additions are principally in the OECD before 2030, followed by Asia and ROW. After 2030, these three regions continue to dominate capacity additions more or less equally. Capacity additions are mainly in countries that lack indigenous fuel resources.
• Through 2030, competition for new capacity additions is largely from coal and to a lesser extent gas. After 2030 solar is nuclear power's principal competitor.
• In the OECD and REF, however, coal is the dominant competitor as late as 2050-2060.
• Nuclear is assumed to fare a bit better than solar in the OECD, while solar is assumed to fare much better in Asia after 2030.
These are the quantitative outlines of the market for nuclear electricity in the A2 scenario. Again, the next step is to build on the description in the SRES report, but to go beyond it to reflect our own interpretations of the A2 scenario's features that are most relevant for nuclear technologies.
The major factors determining the use of nuclear power are, first, economics and, second, the security and diversity of fuel supplies. Specific cost targets associated with the A2 scenario are addressed in a separate paper (Rogner et al., 2008) . They are less stringent than in the A1T scenario, reflecting slower technological progress and the extensive drawdown of fossil resources that potentially keeps real costs high. Competitiveness requirements will vary significantly across countries. Energy supply security will also be an important concern given the A2 scenario's high energy demand and regionalised geopolitics. The emphasis on self-reliance will be an important reason for nuclear power expansion in countries that have the necessary technical capability but limited indigenous resources.
In the developed world, centralised large-scale nuclear power parks cover a large share of nuclear electricity generation. Major nuclear parks are built on already existing sites taking advantage of economies of scale, licensing and environmental pre-approval, and the availability of labour and technical infrastructures.
Large developing countries with operating nuclear programmes in 2000 are in a better position to expand their nuclear share than countries without current programmes. Regionalisation means less standardisation of designs and a greater tendency for different supplier-buyer groupings to each become partially locked in to different design approaches.
Some smaller countries depend on regional nuclear fuel processing facilities and local regulatory infrastructures that follow criteria defined by international organisations. Spent fuel and waste are very much national responsibilities that are mostly dealt with nationally. There are not strong environmental or recycling pressures for reprocessing in the A2 scenario. Economics will be the determining factor, leading to the continuation of once-through fuel cycles based on relatively low-cost uranium resources.
International waste disposal is unlikely in such a regionalised world. Regional initiatives are possible, but are generally resisted by the international community. Transport of nuclear materials, particularly between regions and near non-nuclear countries (e.g., Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)), generates substantial resistance. Decommissioning requirements vary among countries but are unlikely to require restoration to green field conditions. Table 2 Electricity production and growth by region in the A2 scenario Table 2 Electricity production and growth by region in the A2 scenario (continued)
A number of smaller countries with less financial capability are able to operate modular units adapted to smaller regional grids. Self-sufficient reactors that meet high safety and proliferation resistance standards are used in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. But for most developing countries the biggest liabilities are the lack of an infrastructure, high capital costs and safeguards constraints.
B1 marker scenario 6
General scenario description
The 'B' in 'B1' indicates a world in which environmental objectives have a strong influence relative to economic growth objectives. The '1' indicates a world better characterised by globalisation than regionalism. The central elements of the B1 future are a high level of environmental and social consciousness combined with a globally coherent approach to more sustainable development. Technological change plays an important role resulting in final energy intensity improvements between 1.8 and 2% per year. The level of economic activity is high (a global GDP of around US$ 400 trillion by 2100), and there is significant and deliberate progress toward income equality. Global income per capita in 2050 averages US$ 19,000.
Increasing and more equally distributed affluence leads to better birth control and medical services. Together with policies oriented toward education for women and community-based initiatives, these cause a rapid decline in fertility levels. World population peaks at about nine billion people around 2050 and drops to seven billion by 2100.
As was the case with the A1T scenario, we recognise that the B1 scenario in the SRES report describes a plausible outcome in a world that explicitly eschews policies limiting GHG emissions while otherwise aggressively pursuing a globally coherent approach to more sustainable development. As is evident from the top panel of Figure 3 , however, these policies have a substantial environmental co-benefit. The B1 emission trajectory is consistent with stabilising the atmospheric carbon concentration below 500 ppmv, a level potentially consistent with the objectives of the UNFCCC. Because of this, and because the subsequent addition of a 550 ppmv carbon concentration constraint on top of the SRES B1 scenario makes no difference to the quantitative modelling results, we believe this scenario also describes a plausible outcome in a world that is just like the SRES B1 world with one exception -it does choose to implement explicit policies on GHG emissions (Langlois et al., 2002) . Thus it would be a plausible trajectory for a B1-like world that includes the Kyoto Protocol and successive (or alternative) more stringent agreements.
Infrastructure and energy system
The essential features of the global energy system in the B1 scenario are that primary energy use peaks around 2050 at about 800-900 EJ (compared to about 410 EJ in 2000) and then declines through the end of the century (see Figure 6 and Table 3 ). Global electricity use follows a similar pattern. Table 3 Electricity and hydrogen production and growth by region in the B1 scenario Table 3 Electricity and hydrogen production and growth by region in the B1 scenario (continued)
Table 3
Electricity and hydrogen production and growth by region in the B1 scenario (continued)
As noted above, population growth is limited in the B1 scenario. Urbanisation trends are halted or even reversed as orientation shifts to more decentralised living. The B1 scenario foresees major gains in productivity and efficiency, and a large part of these gains is invested in equity, social institutions and environmental protection.
The affluent regions develop consistent and effective ways to support sustainable development in the poor regions, technology transfer agreements being one of the instruments. Increasingly, business and government leaders support eco-efficiency initiatives to decouple pollutant release and resource use from economic activity. Capital markets respond negatively to adverse environmental incidents and environmental externalities are steadily internalised.
Regional specialisation and trade are part of the competitive global industry. The pace of technological innovations is high and RD&D expenses, as a fraction of gross world product, increase. Recycling materials becomes a global business because national governments enforce waste-management laws and guarantee decent profitability.
Changing activities, values and lifestyles, the transition to a service and information economy, and the inclusion of the informal economy all contribute to a decline in energy and material demand per unit of economic output. Regional long-run sectoral consumption shares move toward the level of those in the USA, implying a decline in the share of manufacturing sectors to around 7.5% of total consumption.
The B1 storyline sees a relatively smooth transition to alternative energy systems as conventional oil and gas resources decline. There is extensive use of conventional and unconventional gas as the cleanest fossil resource during the transition, but the major push is toward post-fossil technologies, driven in large part by environmental concerns. Environmental degradation is, in most regions, gradually reversed, as environmental amenities become part of 'the good life'. Negative side effects of rapid development are anticipated and dealt with effectively; externalities are priced.
The electricity generation system undergoes a huge expansion. By the end of the century, Latin American, Africa, India and the rest of South Asia, and China plus other Asian centrally planned countries have the largest installed capacity. In all regions, the non-fossil options start to penetrate between 2020 and 2050. The main driving force is the highly successful development of solar, wind, safe nuclear and others technologies.
B1 technologies
The B1 scenario's relatively low peak and subsequent decline in global energy use are driven by low populations and high efficiencies, not by sacrificing anyone's standard of living. In Western Europe in 2050, for example, comfort and mobility could be high at say 100 m 2 of floor space per capita (compared to 40 in 1990) and some 20,000 km of travel per capita per year (compared to 10,400 km/p.c. in 1990). But energy use would be low because efficiency is high. For example, the specific fuel use of buildings per square meter of floor area could improve by a factor of four, and most of the increase in mobility would be provided by public transport, including high-speed rail and aircraft, that complements the high information and communication flows of a unified Europe. Many cars would be rented or leased rather than owned. Small vehicles using perhaps 3 litres per 100 km would be used for urban commutes; larger (5 litres per 100 km) vans for weekends and holidays. Car manufacturers would become providers of 'cradle-to-grave' car services, ensuring the high recycling rates that underlie the B1 scenario's decline in industrial energy use. Although cars remain the most important passenger transport option in the B1 scenario, both ownership and annual driving distances saturate in most regions below present-day US levels. Average fuel efficiency increases by perhaps a factor of five; electric and hybrid methanol-and ethanol-based cars make up an ever larger share of the market as they are appreciated for their convenience and low noise and pollution levels.
Electricity grids and pipeline networks (for oil, gas and synthetic fuels) will have their place in the B1 scenario, but lower urbanisation, technological leapfrogging and environmental priorities will also encourage, particularly in suitable developing regions, local energy systems -large and small -that are not necessarily connected to a major grid. However, both large grid-based systems and localised systems will incorporate new technology to maximise efficiency and capacity utilisation and continually route energy from where it is most available in a system to where it is most needed. Excellent monitoring, good energy management both by computers and people, and greater consumer discipline steadily improve system efficiency. Despite the diversity of energy systems that develop in these conditions, a key feature of the B1 scenario is the convergence of regional technologies, i.e., the rapid improvement of technological performance and efficiency parameters in all countries toward the levels in leading countries, such as Japan or the USA.
Implications for nuclear energy
As shown in Table 3 , electricity is the principal product of NPPs for a long time, but opportunities exist for hydrogen production, heat and desalination. In Asia, electricity growth dramatically increases through the first half of the century, by as much as eight times the level in 2000. But then from 2050 to 2100 electricity use grows by less than one third. In Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, electricity use peaks in the second half of the century at the order of 15 times today's level. In the economies in transition, electricity use levels off after mid-century at a bit less than three times today's level. In the OECD, growth slows substantially, averaging less than 0.5%/year in the second half of the century. Taken together, the global peak in electricity use is around 2080, at about five times today's level. Nuclear power's principal competitors will be other non-fossil electricity generation technologies, i.e., renewables, both centralised and decentralised. As is evident from Figure 6 and Table 3 , the MESSAGE B1 quantification largely assumes that the renewables win the competition, especially outside the OECD. This is due to assumed rapid improvements in the costs of renewables well suited to decentralised growth in developing countries. It is not due to political barriers to NPPs outside the OECD. Thus if costs can be reduced rapidly enough for NPP designs that match features of the B1 scenario as described below, nuclear energy could play a more substantial role than in Table 3 .
As the B1 world gets ever better at squeesing efficiency gains out of the energy system, it will become ever more complex and 'smart' -increasingly interconnecting everything to everything else to minimise idle capacity and minimise waste. Each technology will have to be constantly adapted to exploit its comparative advantage in a highly interconnected though largely decentralised system. Windmills and solar power plants will be run to maximum capacity when it is windy and sunny; solar thermal systems will heat hot water wherever possible; buildings will be designed and landscaped to use natural light as much as possible to preserve heat when it is cold and to insulate against heat when it is hot. Nuclear power's advantage as a reliable source of base load power will have additional value as the B1 world gets ever better at redistributing demand throughout the daily and seasonal cycles to minimise both capacity requirements for peak demand and idle capacity at cyclical low points. Rather than providing large storage capacities in the energy system (in the form of hydrogen, pumped storage, compressed gas, super conducting batteries, etc.), the principal approaches to minimising idle capacity are managerial. Some of this energy management is automated, as computers route energy from where it is most available to where it is most needed. Other aspects are institutional, to distribute peak transport loads throughout the day and week, for example, or to greatly expand leasing (or timesharing) so that there are fewer identically idle, privately owned assets (like cars) and more shared but highly utilised assets. This is much more a 'just-in-time' future than a 'large inventory' future. But there will still be a role for limited energy storage, both for intermittent renewables and base load NPPs, with hydrogen as a likely important storage medium.
However, the B1 scenario describes a future where environmental concerns have high priority. For nuclear energy to have anything other than a dying role in the B1 world, it will have to have resolved current concerns about safety and waste at least to the satisfaction of mainstream environmentalists. Assuming that increasingly strict safety standards follow the progression foreseen by conventional wisdom today, future standards would likely require, as in the other scenarios, passive safety systems and no possible radiation impact beyond the park perimeter. We would expect strict standards negotiated at the international level with compliance also overseen by international regulators.
The resolution of current safety concerns embodied in such standards would likely be partly technological, but much of it would be institutional. A transparent institutional process that bundles nuclear power with medical applications and isotope production, distances it from nuclear weapons and unites critics and nuclear engineers as joint problem-solvers on the same side of the table, may be more helpful than a whole series of clever technological fixes. The B1 world has a lot of faith in its ability to actively manage the energy system (and other systems) with ever increasing efficiency. Thus siting is relatively easy within the agreed safety framework, as localities generally accept international standards and reject NIMBYism.
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The B1 world's faith in its active management abilities means that it may also prefer reprocessing, including, possibly, future partitioning and transmutation, in order to further utilise spent fuel and minimise final waste volumes, and surface management of all spent nuclear fuel and waste to leave open the possibility of future advances that turn current waste into a valuable resource. Where permanent disposal is necessary, the preference is likely to be for relatively few international disposal sites. International disposal makes it possible for smaller countries to adopt nuclear energy without having to invest in the full fuel cycle infrastructure. The B1 scenario is also most likely to see cooperative global progress toward international control of proliferation-sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, as currently called for by the Director General of the IAEA (ElBaradei, 2003 (ElBaradei, , 2005 (ElBaradei, , 2006 .
Recycling and waste minimisation, with international final disposal sites and international control of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, could well mean a relatively high transport intensity for nuclear materials. These would likely be governed by agreed strict international standards high on transparency and inclusiveness.
The importance of recycling and waste minimisation in the B1 philosophy has design implications related to decommissioning. First, technologies and designs that offer some promise for continual upgrading and improvement will be more appealing than designs and technologies characterised by a limited useful life after which they must be 'thrown away'. Second, for everything from telephones to power plants, there will be a preference for designs that lend themselves to eventual disassembly with most of their components recycled rather than discarded as waste. (This and other 'preferences' in the B1 scenario are expressed both through government regulations and in the market where a company's energy and material efficiency are reflected both in its market valuation and in its popularity with consumers.) For NPPs, this places a particular premium on designs that minimise any product of decommissioning that has to be considered waste due to radioactivity. But it also suggests that designs that dovetail with near-term decommissioning challenges for existing NPPs will have an advantage. In a B1 world, there will be a reluctance to close down and 'throw away' existing nuclear assets if:
• there is agreement on spent fuel management along the lines outlined above
• concerns about proliferation are adequately dealt with (see below)
• some combination of additional transparency and engagement in safety procedures, together with additional monitoring and safety features, responds successfully to mainstream environmentalist safety concerns
• lifetime extensions offer opportunities not available today to reduce the ultimate waste left over at the end of decommissioning.
Thus there may be some promise in an approach that tries to leverage success in addressing near-term decommissioning challenges into advantages for follow-up designs.
On the other hand, it may be more important to have something that is clearly new and distinct from existing NPPs if the B1 world is to be persuaded that this is 'new nuclear' of the sort envisioned by the SRES authors of the scenario. But persuading the B1 world that new designs successfully respond to mainstream environmentalist concerns about safety and waste may depend even more on procedural and institutional innovations and initiatives than on engineering innovations. Proliferation resistance and physical security are not likely to be major concerns for two reasons. First, the B1 world is a very cooperative world, in which the income gap between rich and poor closes especially fast. Diversity is considered a strength, and local cultures are particularly respected. Much of the political tension that might motivate state-or terrorist-sponsored nuclear weapons development is therefore greatly diminished. Second, the ever-increasing efficiency of the energy system comes partly from intensive monitoring of all its components, and careful and transparent management, to maximise recycling and minimise waste and idle capacity. In the B1 world, the sort of openness, transparency, extensive data collection and careful continuous monitoring that could contribute to effective safeguards and physical protection all come naturally. This does not mean NPP designers can forget about proliferation resistance and physical security. Indeed, there is likely to be broad international agreement on quite stringent standards. It does mean that designers should cater to the strengths of the B1 world. A design that monitors and makes it easy to verify everything all the time is more likely to be praised for its accessibility and wealth of data than criticised for its opportunities for diversion. A self-sufficient design that is only opened up every five or ten years may be more criticised for its lack of transparency than praised for its barriers to diversion.
Potential purchasers of NPPs will cover a wide spectrum from independent power producers (IPPs) to utilities, multinational conglomerates and governments. Technology and designs will be rapidly diffused and transferred in response to economics, to diverse national needs and resources and to joint interests in speeding development in developing countries. The electricity market will be largely decentralised and market driven, but with lots of government intervention in the form of environmental incentives, energy taxes and safety nets for consumers. There will be lots of room for both energy traders and asset owners, and there will be substantial integration into services. Preferences for different technologies (and different possible products) will vary geographically with resources, national objectives and regional preferences, but energy security will not be a major concern. This is a world that sees security in interconnectedness and trading driven by comparative advantage. Supply diversity still contributes to resilience, but is less important than it would be in a less cooperative world.
Most purchasers will be in developing countries, particularly in Asia and possibly Latin America, and most purchases will occur in the first half of the century. On the one hand, the B1 world's emphasis on services should favour providers who offer NPPs as parts of packages that help the buyers deliver their products or services to their customers more successfully. A package could include things like grid planning, new product development and subsequent dispatching optimisation as well as training, maintenance and spare parts. On the other hand, some buyers may be intermediaries who already have these capabilities and do their own packaging for their own customers. There will certainly be customers who outsource nearly all other parts of the fuel cycle beyond the power plant. This is possible and welcome in the B1 world where monitoring and oversight are available and respected, and where commitments to improving efficiency and reducing waste argue for locating components of the fuel cycle wherever it is most efficient to do so.
Summing up the principal features of the B1 scenario relevant to prospective markets for nuclear energy:
• B1 is distinctive in that global and regional energy use (primary, final and electricity) peak around 2060-2080 and then decline.
• Much is similar to the A1T scenario, but the shift from the OECD to developing region markets is much faster.
• Principal product markets are electricity and, especially after 2030, hydrogen.
• For both electricity and hydrogen, capacity additions are greatest in ROW, then Asia, then OECD, and, well behind, REF.
• After 2030, the prime principal markets for new capacity are largely ROW and Asia.
• Nuclear energy's principal competition for new electricity capacity is solar and (until 2040) gas.
• Nuclear energy's principal competition for new hydrogen capacity is gas, biomass and (after 2040) solar.
• Solar is largely assumed to beat out nuclear energy for both electricity and hydrogen generation.
B2 marker scenario
General scenario description 8
In the B2 scenario economic, demographic and technological change largely follow historical trends. The 'B' in 'B2' indicates a world in which environmental objectives have a strong influence relative to economic growth objectives. The '2' indicates a world better characterised by regionalism than globalisation. B2 comes closest to what many analysts would label dynamics-as-usual scenario.
In general, the B2 storyline is consistent with current institutional frameworks in the world and with 'technology dynamics as usual' in line with historical energy intensity improvement rates of around 1% per year. Thus the pace of innovation is slower than in the B1 or A1T scenarios, but considerably faster than in the A2 scenario, resulting in significant changes in the energy mix compared to the current situation. The B2 scenario represents a logical evolution of today's institutions with one exception: in the environmental area in which local and regional concerns and regulations modify a number of work and living patterns while forcing the penetration of more environmentally benign technologies and fuels. But strategies to address global environmental challenges are not a central priority and are less successful than local and regional environmental response strategies.
The population reaches about 10 billion people by 2100. Global average income per capita grows at an intermediate rate from about US$ 4,900 in 1990 to reach about US$ 14,000 by 2050. By 2100 the global economy might expand to reach some US$ 300 trillion. International income differences decrease, but not rapidly.
Freshwater supplies are likely to be a problem in the B2 scenario given substantial population growth, environmental priorities likely to encourage expanding biomass energy production (and associated water requirements) and no acceleration in technological progress. But prospects for nuclear desalination are still limited. Most coastal developing countries with water scarcity problems in their coastal areas, which will be the case largely in North Africa and the Middle East, are unlikely to have much nuclear power. South Africa, Pakistan, China and India are more likely candidates for nuclear desalination.
Energy system and infrastructure
The energy system in the B2 scenario is characterised by evolutionary and innovative technologies whose development is motivated both by environmental concerns and policies to assure energy supply security in a regionalised world. Consequently, there is a worldwide reduction in the relative use of high carbon content fuels such as coal and non-commercial fuels while natural gas, nuclear power and renewables gain considerably. The energy system is not homogeneous but varies regionally according to resource availability and financial capability.
Throughout 2100, electricity and 'others' (including hydrogen) remain the fastest growing forms of final energy use reflecting an effective electrification and decarbonisation process. Nevertheless, in 2050 liquids still have the highest share of the final energy mix, followed by electricity, gas and 'others' (see Figure 7) . Although globally the energy system remains predominantly hydrocarbon-based to 2100, a gradual transition occurs away from the current share of fossil resources in world energy supply, with a corresponding reduction in carbon intensity.
Local and regional control over the energy system is less likely to be implemented through broad market mechanisms than through approval and licensing procedures that reflect particular local and regional objectives. All energy facilities can expect to face relatively strict environmental constraints concerning near-term local and regional impacts such as air pollution and safety concerns. For nuclear power, these are expected to require passive safety systems and no possible radiation impact beyond the park perimeter, as in the other scenarios, although much more variation among national standards and procedures is expected than in the more internationally cooperative B1 scenario. One further implication of a regionalised world is more concern about proliferation and physical security, less faith in international institutional safeguards, more emphasis on technology than procedures and incentives for self-sufficient sealed reactors as the proliferation resistant route to introducing nuclear power in countries without it today.
For the energy systems of developing countries, increasing affluence and the emphasis on local environmental protection lead to a big drop in non-commercial and solid fuels in the final energy mix and a big increase in electricity. Differences persist among regional primary energy structures right through 2100, reflecting both the different regional endowments of energy resources and the B2 scenario's emphasis on regional self-reliance and slow interregional technology diffusion.
B2 technologies
Synthetic liquid fuels, particularly methanol, take a growing share of the transport market from petrol and diesel, particularly after 2050, as conventional oil becomes scarce and no serious investment is made in unconventional sources. Most methanol comes from natural gas or biomass in 2050. Between 2050 and 2100, biomass' contribution to synthetic fuels continues to grow, but that of gas levels off and coal begins to play a small but increasing role. The B2 scenario's relatively low economic growth, slow technological development and policies discouraging road transport mean a slow transition away from internal combustion engines to predominantly methanol-based fuel cells. There is almost no hydrogen in the transport sector in this scenario, nor much in the way of electric vehicles. There may be many alternative fuel cars, trucks and buses on the road, but even the fuel cell vehicles are using on-board reforming of methanol and other synthetics rather than pure hydrogen. Consistent with the expansion of resilient, flexible local grid arrangements, there is a fair amount of expansion of energy suppliers into energy services. Potential exists for large integrated companies supplying local services (e.g., insulation, smart meters, and fuel cell and furnace maintenance), local equipment (e.g., fuel cells, rooftop photovoltaics or solar hot water systems, and energy efficient appliances) and backup power to local grids catering to different consumers' preferences (e.g., all renewable, carbon free, nuclear free, etc.). There is room both for firms that are principally traders (serving as middlemen between consumers and asset owners who actually own and run power plants or sell fuel cells) and for firms that manufacture their own products, whether electricity or efficient appliances. In general, however, there is a preference for decentralised ownership, whether government or private. Large power plants (either monolithic or modular) are still needed to serve areas with high demand concentrations, particularly large cities. Because the B2 scenario describes a more regionalised than globalised world, concerns about energy supply security and strengthening domestic industries have a significant impact on the choice of generating technologies. Thus large hydropower is attractive where resources are available, and clean coal is attractive in countries with large coal reserves. Clean coal's GHG emissions are not penalised. Consistent with the B2 scenario's assumed failure of the UNFCCC process due to competing national interests, there are no countries that unilaterally take on the economic burden of carbon reductions. Nuclear power is an attractive option where natural gas and coal resources are limited, and nuclear technology improvements are faster than coal improvements, driven by the environmental priority given to nuclear power's lower local air pollution emissions. New sites are hard to come by for hydro, coal and NPPs given the emphasis on local control and environmental protection. This creates incentives for power upratings, lifetime extensions and adding new plants where space is available on existing sites.
The role of hydrogen in the developed countries is small and mainly driven by energy storage objectives connected with intermittent renewables. The intermittency problem of solar and wind power is largely solved by integrating them regionally with power plants (large or small) and with stationary fuel cells and backup generators fuelled by storable natural gas or synthetic fuels like methanol. But the storage issue also drives some improvements and applications of hydrogen production from renewables.
Implications for nuclear energy
In the SRES quantification of the B2 scenario, nuclear power grows at a relatively fast pace from 8.4 EJ in 2000 to 48 EJ in 2050 and 142 EJ in 2100 (see Figure 7) . Nuclear power use varies regionally, and by 2050 it is highest in Asia. During the 2040-2050 period, the Asia and ROW regions, i.e., the developing countries, experience the greatest increase in nuclear additions effectively shifting the nuclear energy markets from developed countries to principally the leading emerging economies among developing countries ( Table 4 ). Note that the coal revival in the second half of the century in Figure 7 is driven mainly by the transportation sector, not electricity generation. Due to high pressure on the oil resource base in this scenario, liquefied coal and biomass (methanol) become the eventual dominant carriers for vehicular transportation.
Electricity remains the primary product of NPPs in the B2 scenario, and, while the energy system is more decentralised than today, it is still significantly regulated in connection with environmental impacts at the local level. NPPs will have to compete in ostensibly liberalised electricity markets, but government regulations and subsidies, both direct and indirect, will have at least as big an impact as market forces. These will vary among countries, provinces and localities reflecting the relative importance each assigns to factors like energy supply security, support for local energy industries and reduced environmental impacts. Thus the cost of investing in a NPP will vary with location, as will the costs of competing investment alternatives. The race may go to those who are quickest both at identifying locations that favour their technologies and at customising their designs to local preferences. A prevalence of customised one-off designs will likely complicate all subsequent stages of the fuel cycle -from safeguards to decommissioning.
In the developed countries, the preferred strategy may be to focus on capturing economies of scale with large plants (modular or monolithic) that need a minimum of new sites. It is possible to imagine small NPPs that, in terms of size, better match the notion of smaller, more locally self-reliant and robust grids. But given the emphasis on local control, likely variations among the expectations of different regulators and the preference for renewables, this market is more likely to demand a series of precisely negotiated and customised one-off variations, than to provide a profitable mass market for small modular reactors. In any event, significant new safety features (both for operation and materials transport) would probably matter more for smaller designs seeking approval from diverse local regulators than for large designs intended mainly for existing sites.
Despite the apparent importance of adapting designs to local situations, the B2 world remains one in which technological frontiers are not pushed aggressively, environmentalism is quite influential and the regulatory process is not streamlined. These all imply difficulties for funding and licensing new designs, and limited flexibility for subsequent variations. In countries and localities where NPPs are supported and where they can compete economically, the best strategy may be to emphasise standard proven designs (by 2050 standards, not 2007 standards) with a limited number of variations to meet local concerns, rather than more aggressively innovative designs. However, given the B2 scenario's regional variations, we can expect that different countries will pursue different design approaches, given their different experiences, circumstances and preferences, and will gradually become locked in to these approaches, other things being equal, in this only moderately innovative world.
In the regionalised B2 world, each country will retain responsibility at least for regulating nuclear power facilities and transport, for decommissioning, and for the ultimate disposition of wastes. Countries will vary in their perspectives on reprocessing and reducing the longevity of high-level waste, with opposition based varyingly on proliferation and environmental concerns and economics. As a result, many will continue to rely on once-through fuel cycles. The transport of nuclear material will remain a problematic issue. The lack of international facilitating agreements, together with national environmental priorities, will create strong incentives to minimise transport requirements. Table 4 Electricity production and growth by region in the B2 scenario Table 4 Electricity production and growth by region in the B2 scenario (continued)
National environmental priorities will lead to decommissioning standards requiring restoration to green field conditions. Concerns about proliferation will be substantial, with a preference for technical rather than institutional safeguards to augment proliferation resistance. However, the frequency of one-off variations on basic designs and the regionalised decentralisation in many grids will make uniform safeguards technologies difficult to put in place. Despite the preference for technical approaches to safeguards, the B2 world will still depend heavily on complementary institutional safeguards measures.
As noted earlier, national variations among countries, due to different circumstances and preferences, will influence investment decisions in different ways in different countries. Some may be quite direct (e.g., direct government investments or guarantees) while others may be indirect (e.g., subtle indirect subsidies to competing domestic resource industries or increased government funding for unrelated purposes to communities willing to host facilities that are in the national interest). Thus any nuclear advantages in terms of energy supply security, for example, or beneficial spin-off effects on industrial development will need to be persuasive to governments more than to markets. Note that some national-level issues may also be important to the regulators who control decisions at the local level. In the rather green world of the B2 scenario, continuing delays in demonstrating and operating long-term waste disposal sites could prompt local regulators to block NPPs, no matter how safe, clean and economic they are otherwise. The immediate reason would be the prospect of a locality being stuck with long-term onsite storage. The broader reason would be an environmental objection to generating more waste without facilities in operation to dispose of it.
Large developing countries that already have some nuclear experience are in a better position to have the required infrastructure, expertise, potential waste disposal capability and financial resources associated with nuclear power in the B2 world. The lack of financing available through aid and international lending institutions, together with private financial institutions and investors that are relatively constrained in the regionalised B2 world, means that reductions in the capital costs of NPPs will be important. Given the front-loaded cost structure of NPPs, modular units may be attractive because they require investments in smaller chunks. The argument that small reactors are well suited to small grids should matter less in big developing countries, which may be growing fast enough and may be protected enough from market ups and downs to absorb capacity additions in large increments.
Smaller developing countries currently without nuclear power will find it difficult in the B2 regionalised world to develop the required infrastructure and expertise for nuclear power. However, a small 'self-sufficient' reactor that a supplier delivers fuelled, sealed and ready to go; that can operate for lengthy periods between refuellings; that is replaced by the supplier when it needs refuelling; that persuasively meets high safety and proliferation resistance standards (during transport as well as operation); and that shifts all of the fuel cycle and quality control onto the supplier and the supplier's country may have a market both in developing countries, small and large, and in localised self-reliant grids in selected developed countries. Table 5 summarises the main differences discussed above among the A1T, A2, B1 and B2 scenarios for characteristics relevant to the design of nuclear RD&D policies. As noted at the outset, for performance requirements, this paper provides only the initial qualitative steps summarised in Table 5 for the translation of storylines into quantitative performance requirements. In the area of economics, however, a subsequent paper (Rogner et al., 2008) seeks to develop cost targets for new nuclear power designs to be competitive in the mid-century energy markets implied by the selected SRES scenarios as well as cost targets for faster nuclear expansion than in the SRES scenarios.
Summary nuclear translations for the four selected SRES scenarios
Using scenario results to guide RD&D
In the four scenarios analysed here, nuclear power for electricity generation increases 2.5-4-fold between 2000 and 2030 and 3.5-10-fold between 2000 and 2050. In fact, only one out of the 40 SRES scenarios includes a decline of nuclear power by 2050. It appears that even in the absence of policies targeted at mitigating climate change, there is high agreement in the scenarios that nuclear power is set to grow over the coming decades independent of the different storylines.
There are certain implications for the utility and nuclear power industries ranging from nuclear fuel supply, nuclear power technology to waste disposal and proliferation, especially for the scenarios with substantial growth in nuclear electricity. RD&D and new reactor designs are at the core of all marker scenarios (see Table 5 ). Uranium exploration and investments in mining activities are growing in all scenarios. In the scenarios with higher nuclear growth, uranium supply would rely progressively on unconventional uranium occurrences or shift towards reprocessing of spent fuel. As Table 5 shows, reactor unit size varies across scenarios -so do fuel cycles and approaches to decommissioning. With nuclear power expanding by at least a factor of 2.5 over year 2000 production levels, solutions to high-level wastes are likely to be implemented well before 2050. Economies of scale, assurances of fuel supply and proliferation control suggest regional or multinational approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle including waste disposal.
Because different scenarios imply different priorities and targets for different RD&D objectives (economics, proliferation resistance, etc.), it is worth spending some time on the issue of probabilities -i.e., for each of the scenarios, what is the likelihood that it accurately reflects the future development of the global energy system? Of course, in a strict sense, the probability that the future will evolve precisely in accordance with any one scenario is zero. But there are many more interesting questions. For example, does one think it is more likely that the future will resemble the A1T scenario or the A2 scenario? What odds would one be willing to give (or insist on being given) to bet on either of these options against the other?
The SRES authors explicitly and strenuously avoid offering any opinions on probabilities. However, in urging users to view all 40 scenarios equally and to always use at least one scenario from each of the four storylines, they are, in effect, urging users to act as if all the scenarios were equally probable. Table 5 Generic plant requirements: at times representing conflicting objectives Table 5 Generic plant requirements: at times representing conflicting objectives (continued) On the other hand, a nuclear RD&D policymaker should only act as if all SRES scenarios were equally probable if that person really believes that they are indeed equally probable. It would be irresponsible to spend money preparing for a future considered completely implausible. Indeed a policy maker should go even a bit further. The job is not just to analyse how alternative policy options might fare under a suitably probable range of SRES scenarios, but to identify a preferred outcome and choose policies that increase the probability of that outcome. The task is not so much to design policies that fare well no matter how the dice may fall, but to design policies that load the dice in favour of a preferred scenario.
Having raised these questions, we, like the SRES authors, will strenuously avoid offering our own opinions either about probabilities or a preferred scenario. But those opinions will have to be provided -either implicitly or explicitly -by anyone wishing to apply Table 5 , and the additional detail in the body of this paper, to the design of nuclear RD&D programmes.
